Food processing plants are an underrated group in fire engineering, yet they are known for very large losses. The product often looks non-combustible; the real risk sits in the building fabric (insulated sandwich panels), the process (fryers, ovens, dryers, dust) and the logistics side (packaged finished goods, cold rooms). Hygiene rules also constrain where and how fire protection pipework can run.
Hazard classification: NFPA 13 and EN 12845
In the NFPA 13 example lists, canning, beverage and dairy production are generally OH1, while confectionery and flour or feed mills sit around OH2. In EN 12845 Annex A, most food and beverage manufacturing falls in the OH2–OH3 range. The final class depends on product, packaging and process and should be confirmed against Annex A.
| Area | NFPA 13 (typical) | EN 12845 (typical) | Note |
|---|---|---|---|
| Wet process lines (dairy, beverage, canning) | OH1 | OH1–OH2 | Panels and packaging can raise the class |
| Baking, cooking, confectionery lines | OH1–OH2 | OH2–OH3 | Oil vapour and flour dust deposits |
| Industrial fryers | Area: OH2; appliance: local suppression | Area: OH3; appliance: local suppression | Sprinklers do not extinguish oil fires |
| Dust-producing areas (flour, sugar, milk powder) | OH2 + dust explosion measures | OH3 + ATEX measures | NFPA 61 / NFPA 652 approach |
| Packaging material store | Storage criteria (plastics) | Storage criteria (category III–IV) | Film, foam and cartons decide |
| Finished goods warehouse | Storage criteria | Storage criteria | Product, packaging and pallet together |
For a first pass use the NFPA 13 hazard classification tool and the EN 12845 hazard class finder; for EN examples see Annex A typical classification.
Structural risk: sandwich panels
Internal partitions and cold room walls in food plants are often foam-cored sandwich panels. If the core is combustible, fire travels inside the panel where sprinklers cannot reach it; the facings delaminate and ceilings collapse. Design decisions:
- Where possible, choose non-combustible cores (mineral wool) or panels with insurer-accepted test performance.
- The void above walk-on panel ceilings usually needs protection; it holds cable trays, ductwork and lighting connections.
- Penetrations for pipes and cables must be fire-stopped.
System selection
- Wet pipe: the standard answer for heated production and packing areas. Use corrosion-resistant heads and coatings in washdown zones.
- Dry pipe or pre-action: for cold rooms, blast freezers and unheated loading areas. See cold storage warehouse fire protection.
- Fryers and cooking lines: an appliance-specific local application system (wet chemical, water mist or CO₂) with heater/fuel shut-off and exhaust fan interlocks. See industrial deep fryers (NFPA 96).
- Finished goods and packaging stores: ESFR or CMSA in high-bay racking; check suitability with the ESFR suitability checker.
- Dust explosions: explosion venting, suppression and isolation for silos, sieving, milling and spray dryers. Sprinklers do not address this risk. See NFPA 652 dust explosion risk.
Water supply and pumps
The hydraulic demand of a food plant is usually set by the finished goods or packaging store. Warehouse protection can demand several times the flow of the production area, so pumps and tanks are sized on the storage scenario.
- Tank volume: fire water tank sizing; duration by class (under EN 12845, 60 min for OH and 90 min for HH).
- Diesel pump fuel: diesel fire pump fuel tank calculator.
- Hydrant ring main: needed for external firefighting on campus-type sites; hydrant demand is added to sprinkler demand.
- Keep process water and fire water separate, and fit backflow prevention so process chemical dosing cannot reach the fire main.
Detection, alarm and smoke control
- Wet and washdown areas: point smoke detectors struggle; use heat detectors or suitably protected devices.
- Cold rooms: aspirating smoke detection is common, with sampling pipes in the cold space and the detector unit on the warm side.
- Fryers and ovens: flame detection or the system's own heat detection; on discharge, heaters and conveyors must stop.
- Large production halls: natural or mechanical smoke ventilation; size it initially with the smoke vent area calculator. Smoke curtains divide the hall into reservoirs.
- Ammonia refrigeration: ammonia detectors are separate from the fire panel but tied to the scenario; emergency ventilation and power isolation logic in the plant room must be documented.
Turkey: points under the BYKHY
The BYKHY links sprinkler requirements in industrial buildings to hazard class and compartment area, with additional provisions for areas containing flammable and explosive materials. Food plants are often protected above the regulatory minimum because of insurers and, for exporters, customer audits.
- Buildings requiring sprinklers in Turkey
- Which standard applies in Turkey: BYKHY, NFPA, EN 12845
- Fire design approval process
Areas with a dust explosion risk also need ATEX compliance and an explosion protection document; this obligation is separate from the fire protection design.
Common site mistakes
- Unprotected void above panel ceilings. Fires often start or spread there.
- Combustible-core panels dismissed as "just partitions".
- Fryer suppression left unmaintained or disabled. Nozzles removed for cleaning are never refitted.
- Standard-temperature sprinklers around ovens. Rate heads for the ambient: temperature rating selector.
- Dust left on beams and duct tops. A secondary explosion risk.
- Packaging ignored in the finished goods store. Even if the product does not burn, plastic film and foam set the class.
- Washdown hoses aimed at sprinklers. Damaged heads and corrosion.
Design checklist
| Check | What to look at |
|---|---|
| Classification | Process, dust, fryers, packaging and finished goods separately |
| Panels | Core type, approval status, protection of voids above ceilings |
| Cold areas | Dry or pre-action system, aspirating detection |
| Fryers and ovens | Local suppression, interlocks, temperature ratings |
| Dust | Venting or suppression, isolation, housekeeping programme |
| Storage | ESFR/CMSA suitability, in-rack need, flue spaces |
| Water supply | Storage scenario plus hydrants, duration, pump redundancy |
| Hygiene | Corrosion-resistant materials, washdown guards |
| Cause and effect | Ammonia, smoke ventilation, process shutdown |
In a food plant, fire protection is designed together with process engineering. If nobody has written down how the fryer, the dryer and the refrigeration plant are stopped, the fire keeps being fed however well the sprinklers are designed.
Frequently Asked Questions
What hazard class is a food production area?
Under NFPA 13, dairy, beverage and canning are generally OH1, while confectionery and mills are around OH2. Under EN 12845 most food manufacturing falls in OH2–OH3; the final class depends on product and process.
Why do sandwich panels matter so much?
With combustible foam cores, fire travels inside the panel where sprinkler water cannot reach it. Panel choice and protection of the ceiling void directly determine how large the loss becomes.
Will sprinklers put out a fryer fire?
No. Water on burning cooking oil is dangerous. Fryers are protected by an appliance-specific local system with heater shut-off and exhaust interlocks, alongside the area sprinklers.
Are sprinklers enough for dust explosions?
No. Dust explosion risk calls for venting, suppression, isolation and regular housekeeping, designed separately following NFPA 61/652 and ATEX principles.

SprinkCalc — Fire Sprinkler Design Across Three Standards
SprinkCalc covers hazard classification, design density and area, K-factor selection, water demand and hydraulic calculations for NFPA 13, FM Global and BS EN 12845 in a single iOS app, and exports a professional PDF report.
Download SprinkCalc on the App StoreNFPA 13, NFPA 61 (agricultural and food processing dusts), NFPA 652 (fundamentals of combustible dust), NFPA 96, NFPA 72, EN 12845 Annex A, ATEX legislation, Turkish BYKHY. Confirm classes and values with the current edition, the insurer and the authority having jurisdiction. The findings here are typical defect patterns, not an account of events at any particular site.